State coercion and public sector unionism in post-coup Fiji by Leckie, Jacqueline
New Zealand journal of industrial relations, 1991, 16,49-71 
State coercion and public sector unionism 
in post-coup Fiji 
Jacqueline Leckie* 
The trade union movement played a pivotal role in the formation of the Fiji Labour 
Party, and later represented a potential source of organized opposition to the 
military regime which overthrew the Labour Government in 1987. This paper 
explores why the Fiji .a.dministration perceived organized labour as a threat and 
discusses the measures the military r~gime .took to retain control by .weakening any 
political role for unions. Much of the regime's energy in this respect has been 
directed towards the FiJi P .ub.lic Service Association. Its leaders argue that the 
fundamental iss .ue of trade union rights can not be g .uaranteed without the 
protection of human rights and a democratic framework in Fiji, neit.her of which is 
assured in the recently promulgated constitution. 
1. Introduction and background 
The Fiji trade union movement, the strongest expression of organized labour in the 
South Pacific Islands, is facing its biggest threat to its existence. This comes from the 
State which since May 1987 has been a .military backed rcgim~e. However the State's 
response to trade unions should be understood within the historical context of the 
growing power and assertiveness of the labour move.ment in Fiji. This was epitomized 
when the Fiji Trades Union ·Congress (FI'U,C) sponsored the founation of a Fiji Labour 
Party (FLP) in 1985, which, along with sections of the National Federation Party (NFP), 
was elected as the Coalition ~Government in 1987. 
The perception of this as a victory for labour and a change in direction from ethnic 
based politics is fundamental to analysing subsequent developments in Fiji. However, 
most discussion of the coups has failed to address adequately the importance of workers' 
organizations in the foitnation of the FLP and their significance after the coups. This 
paper follows on from ~earlier research into the history of trade unions and especially that 
of Fiji's most powerful union, the Fiji Public Service Association ~(FPSA). The thr~eat 
to trade unions in Fiji can be traced through the strategies the State has adopted to weaken 
this union. 
It could be argued that given the past importance of the FPSA to Fiji's labour 
movement, its survival will be an indicator of the future patterns for labour there. This 
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needs to be placed against changes in the structural context of labour relations in Fiji and 
an assessment of why the regime has been so persistent in containing unions. 
Conflict and accommodation between labour, capital and the State has been played 
out within various political and economic structures during the colonial and post-
colonial contexts. Colonial control was based upon overt coercion sustained through 
direct force. In the past, as in Fiji's contemporary period, the State also exerted its 
dominance over the workforce through restrictive legislation, an absence of consultative 
and workable industrial relations mechanisms, the manipulation of ethnic divisions and 
appeals to traditional loyalties. Initially, such means sought to control mainly Indian 
migrant labour in sugar production, and regulated the entry of indigenous labour into the 
paid workforce (Bain, 1988). Colonial development was sharply focused along communal 
lines (Durutalo, 1985) which in turn reinforced the development of workers' organizations 
along ethnic lines (llince, 1971). Indian migrants and their descendants continued to 
dominate the sugar industry where some of the frrst labour organizations in Fiji emerged 
by World War II. By then the State had also shifted from an anti-union policy to one of 
accommodating acceptable labour organizations. Under pressure from the British 
Government, the colonial administration encouraged the fotntation of compliant trade 
unions through an Industrial Associations Ordinance and the establishment of a Labour 
Department in 1942. 
This picture presents an ethnically divided labour force during the colonial period, but 
on closer examination the details were far more complex. First, there was always a small 
but growing number of indigenous Fijians working in paid employment. Stevedoring 
was one such industry, where Edmund Sanday, of mixed Fijian and European descent, and 
Setareki Nasoki, a Fijian, attempted to fot 111 a trade union in 1916. This was opposed by 
capital, met by brutal repression and blocked by appeals to traditional authority (Hince, 
1985). There were later attempts by Fijians to resist labour control and fottn trade unions 
(Leckie, 1991) but as Bain (1985) has demonstrated with the goldmining industry, 
ethnicity and the traditional hierarchy were utilized as a means of control. Secondly, in 
some sectors the beginnings of a mixed workforce emerged in ~colonial Fiji, notably in 
the public sector. The State's attitudes towards these unions was contradictory. For 
example, it encouraged the existence of ethnically divided unions, the Fijian Teachers' 
Association, exclusively for indigenous Fijians and the Fiji Teachers' Union, open to all 
ethnic groups but attracting mainly Indo-Fijians. 
Unionization in the civil service took a different direction. By 1943, a multi-racial 
Fiji Public Servants' Association was fottned, which became registered as a trade union in 
1958 (Leckie, 1986). Rather than promote the foitnation of splinter associations, the 
colonial adminisu·ators were eager to see civil servants being represented by a "sensibly 
led main union" 1 to avert the possibility of disruptive or politicized unions fom1ing. 
Leadership in the FPSA came from local Europeans and Indo-Fijians, but increasingly as 
Fiji moved towards independence, compliant indigenous leadership was promoted (Leckie, 
1986, p . 24-31) so that stability would prevail when the bureaucracy came under local 
political control. 
This semblance of harmony overlooks the ~existence of serious conflict between 
labour, capital and the State which was reflected in industrial action and. attempts by 
workers to organize (Leckie, 1991). Overt instances were the 1959 oilworkers' strike 
(Hempenstall, 1984, p . 73-86) and industrial unrest within the goldmining industry during 
the 1950s (Bain, 1985) and by sugar workers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These 
expressions of labour militancy were quietened by repression or appeals to ethnic and 
traditional loyalties but, in the longer teun, labour unrest was contained through the 
1 Correspondence from Colonial Secretary to Commissioner of Organisation and 
Establishments, 25 July 1968 (E60/106. Fiji National Archives). 
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acceptance of power bargaining which resulted in gradual wage increases and 
improvements in employment and living conditions for workers. 
By independence in 1970 the labour movement in Fiji did not appear to foreshadow a 
serious threat to the neo-colonial order. In ~contrast to many other colonies, Fiji lacked an 
identifiable nationalist movement which might have encompassed labour militancy 
(Munck, 1988, p.165-171). Documentation to date suggests that popular organizations 
such as unions were excluded from the independence negotiations, but the 1970 
constitution guaranteed the right of free association. 
The honeymoon was brief. Independence did not herald a decade of docile industrial 
relations but gave way to the emergence of a more confrontational style. New labour 
legislation, particularly the Trade Disputes Act 1973, sought to constrain the parameters 
of conflict between workers and employers. This made it very difficult for workers to 
take industrial action, especially in essential services, and weakened joint trade union 
action by outlawing solidarity strikes. The same year saw the implementation of 
unilateral restrictions on free collective bargaining with the ~counter Inflation Act. 
Imposing wage and salary freezes, or non-negotiable guidelines on increases came to be a 
feature of industrial relations in Fiji. Lines between management and labour had been 
sketched in the public sector with the founation of the Public Service Co.m.mission 
(PSC) in 1960, but were funaly drawn in 1975 when the FPSA asserted its independence 
by establishing a full-time secretariat. 
The first half of the 1970s was a period of several stonny labour disputes, but by 
1976 a conciliatory situation appeared to be reached with tripartism guiding wage 
negotiations and many other industrial relations :matters. 'The Tripartite Forum consisted 
of representatives from the FI'UC, the employers and government and although it opened 
the way to dispute solving through its Committee on Industrial Relations, increasingly 
unions became disillusioned as employers peoceived the Forum as a vehicle for imposing 
restraints on wages and salaries (FPSA, Annual R~eport, 1978). This did not constrain 
the FPSA from secwing an impressive record of resolving grievances and disputes in its 
members' favour, ,as well as p~essing for salary rises and improved conditions. 
Any illusions of a cordial relationship between civil service unions and government 
were soon crushed during prolonged and bitter negotiations in the early 1980s over the 
implementation of substantial salary increases recommended through what came to be 
known as the Nicol and Hurst Award. The FPSA's ~claims were successful, but this 
marked ·the beginning of a period of increased hostility between government and public 
sector unions (Howard, 1985; Leckie, 1988). When faced with much broader economic 
problems, ~especially inflation and unemployment, the State laid the cause of a unilateral 
wage and salary freeze in November 1984 at the doors of the FPSA. This marked the end 
of tripartism. This was the most direct cause of the FTUC's reassessment of its 
relationship with the State and its withdrawal from the Tripartite Forum. Although the 
boycott was only while the wage freeze remained in folice, the Government responded by 
withdrawing recognition of the Fl'UC as the national union body. Other related 
developments, such a volunteer teachers' scheme and increased bus far,es for schoolchildren 
led to public sector workers becoming increasingly concerted in their criticism of 
government policies. When workers endorsed the FI'UC's call for a general strike, the 
Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, threatened to declare a state of ,emergency, bring in the army 
and sack civil servants (Fiji Times, 10 January 1985). 
With few ,alternatives, in August 1985 the Fl'1UC launched the FLP to represent the 
inter,ests of workers and provide an ~effective opposition to the ruling Alliance Party. 
Until then the .main opposition party was the NFP. Although it had claimed to draw on 
multi-ethnic and trade union support, by the mid-1980s it offered no real political 
alternatives and was viewed as an Indo-Fijian party. Many unionists believed that the 
subsequent coalition between FLP and sections of the NFP became crucial if unions were 
to retain the advances they had made and to extend these to other sectors of Fiji's 
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workforce. Even in 1985 some unionists 
was under serious threat from the State. 
Several statements from the Alliance 
coups, Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, attributea1 
Many of the leaders of the FLP weze dra\G 
Bavadra, the l~r of the Coalition and 
and Mahendra Chaudhry, general secretary 
Finance during the short-lived Coalition 
efdle Fiji 
to dr8 PPSA. 
RfJiably Dr TimOOI 
lie Mtweea 1977-1985 
die 'liaee 1970 and Minister of 
ot 1911. Rabuta stated that 
The Fiji Public Service Association I knew, WM Datnrally suppwtive of 
Coalition policies. After all, the Labour Party had hatched from the 
Association by the new Prime Minister, Tim.oci Bavaclra, who bad been the 
Association President for years (Dean aud Ritova, 1988, pA6). 
Rabuka's biographers also state (1988. p.33) that the Labour Party was mainly 
backed by the FPSA. Certainly since the early 1980s the FPSA had become increasingly 
critical of the Government's policies and advocated that ttade unions, particularly rank and 
file members, should seek to change wider economic and social inbalances in the nation 
(FPSA, Annual Report, 1985, p.15). While the FPSA became a cornerstone of the FLP, 
it did not singly launch the new party. It was founded and supported by a number of 
unions affiliated to the FI'UC, along with representatives of other groups disenchanted by 
Alliance policy (Lal, 1986, p.139-157; Robertson and Tamanisau, 1988, p.18-42). 
Nevertheless the link between the FPSA and the Coalition appears to have been a 
serious threat to entrenched and powerful interests in the public service, which had 
developed under Alliance rule. A major platfonn of Bavadra's campaign focused on 
accusations of corruption linking politicians, bureaucrats and private concerns (Hagan, 
1987, p.13-14). The Coalition's promise to investigate this if it assumed power implied a 
considerable reshuffle of the civil service. Rabuka cites this as one reason for staging the 
coup: 
The Coalition would move in their own people, and place then1 in prominent 
positions and further their political goals, and use their influence to change the 
directions of Fiji's political, economic and previously excellent foreign 
relations (Dean and Ritova, 1988, p.46). 
The FPSA was considered a threat not only because of its role in the formation of 
the FLP but also because of its willingness to endorse the policies of a Coalition 
government. The FPSA had drawn attention to corruption and inappropriate goveanment 
and management policies years before the FLP was fointed. 
Coalition plans to introduce changes in the bureaucracy and implement new social 
policies were shattered by the coup on 14 May 1987, but the coup did not deter the 
"union threat". This was partly because sections of the labour movement overtly 
criticized and organized opposition to the military regime. Monck (1988, p.176) has 
observed that the ability of military regimes to stabilize may be dependent on the capacity 
of the labour movement to restructure itself and mount a resistance campaign. During 
the immediate post-coup chaos, trade unions were one of the few multi-ethnic opposition 
groups with some kind of institutional structure, even if in most cases this was weak. 
The FPSA, and some, mainly white-collar unions, were exceptions. Chaudhry, quickly 
reinstated as general secretary of the FPSA, along with other union colleagues rapidly 
mustered international trade union support to put pressure on the illegal regime. At the 
FI'UC's request cargo and passenger bans were instigated by New Zealand and Australian 
unions. The effects were dramatic on an island nation heavily dependent upon imports 
and foreign exchange generated from tourist revenue and exports (Howard, 1988, p.187-
190 and p.l98-200). Even after the bans were lifted, unions were able to use this as a 
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threat when human and especially trade union rights were being denied. This fomented 
the regime's hostility towards unions and especially towards Chaudhry, as he opposed the 
FfUC's decision to remove bans on 4 July 1987. Chaudhry continued to rally 
international solidarity and to draw upon the strong links his union had with public sector 
unions in New Zealand and Australia and with international labour bodies such as the 
Postal Telegraph and Telephone International (PTTI), Public Services International (PSI) 
and the International Transport Federation (ITF). The threat of international industrial 
action was also significant in pressuring the government to desist from implementing 
repressive legislation against union activity in the public sector (FPSA, Annual Report 
1989, p.41-2). 
The administration's perception of trade unions as a threat was brought home in 
statements by Taniela Veitata, the fottner trade unionist turned Minister for Employment 
and Industrial Relations, when he described international union concern with labour 
matters in Fiji as tantamount to "war" (Fiji Times, 2 May 1989). A more sinister 
manifestation of this was in a military document submitted by army officers to Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara on 28 May 1989. This attacked, among others, trade unionists, claiming 
that Chaudhry's threat of a national strike against the Gov,ernment's non- r~estoration of 
pay increments was an example of a politically motivated move to challenge the 
Government. The document also raised the Communist bogey supposedly lurking behind 
international trade union links, and proposed its own solution: 
We believe that the threat of further Trade Union strike action can be effectively 
countered by abolishing the Trade Union Movement in Fiji and establishing ,a 
government agency within the Ministry of Labour to look after the interest of 
all the workers.2 
Apparently Veitata had been consulted on labour matters by the writers of this 
document 
The FPSA and Chaudhry's role in the Fiji labour movement has also been 
strengthened tollowing a split in the FI'UC which led to Chaudhry's el~ection as general 
secretary of the Congress in January 1988. Along with other new appointments, this led 
to the FI'UC adopting a som,ewhat more aggressiv~e and critical stand during the past two 
years and extending its educational, training and other programmes {FIUC, 1989). 
Chaudhry is also general secr~etary of the National Fanners' Union which is refusing to 
cut cane during 1990. The administration is implying that their non- acceptance of an 
unsatisfactory sugar award and Chaudhry's threats of international bans on Fijian sugar 
exports is a plot to topple the regime (Fiji Times, 11 June 1990). 
Unions have represented a significant source of opposition to a government which 
came to power behind the gun and will consolidate this through implementing 
discriminatory legislation to disenfranchise many Fijian ~citizens. As Munck notes 
(1988, p.l76), although labour unrest may not always be the direct cause of military 
intervention, it is usually a significant underlying element. Certainly the Fijian regime 
has blamed labour and the unions for precipitating the coups and for post-coup economic 
hardship) 
In practice, however, there has been little concrete evidence of unions taking .militant 
action to destabilize the regime. Words have been their main weapon and Chaudhry 
continued, as before the coup, to be the principal unionist publicly attacking a wide range 
of policies and practices, particularly in the public sector. He questioned the 
accountability of public finances, the transfer of resources from social services to the 
2 Copy of anny document to Ratu Mar~ 28 May 1989. 
3 Correspondence from Colin Clark, General Secretary, New Zealand Public Service 
Association, to Veitat~ 4 August 1989, in reply to letter from V,eitat~ 25 May 1'989 
(NZPSA files). 
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military, and drew aaendon to the 
the public sector but especially in the 
such as promoting the establisbmont of 
criticized as workers there still face ~ 
(FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p.13). 
Commerce demanded that appropriate 
publicity about conditions in the garment · 
recovery of the country" (Fiji Times, 31 
Fundamentally the "danger" posed 
commitment to the resuntion of democracy. 
operation of trade unions depends upon .,_... This 
has focused on the future constitution of .. as a 
concern and have criticized proposals to llllir ---
a base which can question not only the admiaiMtloa'& Jail oar but me 
it rests upon. Chaudhry reported to an Intetaadalld ef Udions 
(ICFIU) executive meeting that: "without a wldcll fb '*'eiples 
of equality, justice and democracy, trade UBiaDS iD Jliji will be unable 10 paaJnely 
protect the interests of those it seeks to represent" (FIJI Tlru1, 28 December 1_,. 
2. Coercion 
Direct coercion 
The most pressure put on unions since the coup bas been through the dueat and use 
of physical force. This was by no means new but circumstances in 1987 gave another 
dimension to direct coercion as a means to control trade unions. The burgeoning 
militarization of the State (Robertson and Tamanisau, 1989) gready increased the 
potential for direct force. During the period when the sight of soldiers, guns and 
roadblocks was commonplace and when civil liberties and human rights weae curtailed, 
abuses against trade unionists were common. Few bade union leaders in 1987 bad any 
experience of direct militant action and had never openly threatened the regime with 
violence. The biggest weapon they had was to mobilize international solidarity. Partly 
to inhibit this and also to intimidate workers from participating in pro-democracy 
activities, the military regime resorted to physically harassing trade union officials and 
directly prohibiting them from engaging in a wide range of acdvities. 
The most immediate direct constraint on trade union activities was when S union 
officials were delivered at gunpoint notices of suspension by the Civil Aviation 
Authority of Fiji (CAAF) in May 1987. This was on the grounds that the officials 
constituted security risks but it is now more probable that the following comments made 
in an unsigned letter to D.P. Singh, the president of the FPSA, were closer to the truth: 
It is clearly victimisation of Union Official and activities, brin1in1 in 
personalities. Check the Madhoji Report. Whatever name you fmd in there u a 
Union wimess, you will also fmd in the aupended lilt. Whoever wu active in 
Union matters, His name is in the suspended lilt. 4 
The suspension of these officials also severely affected the ability of the FPSA to 
take industrial action in this sensitive sector of the public service. The treasurer of the 
Nadi branch reported to Chaudhry in July 1987 that it was difficult to keep membership 
united with the detention of union colleagues.s Not swprisingly. Chaudhry concluded in 
4 File S113/2/2285, FPSA, Suva, 26 May 1987. 
S File N2/366, FPSA, Suva, 12 January 1988. 
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Chaudhry em 
intafering in •~ •• 1 • 1 , r 1 · ' :, · ~ ~ ' } ' ~ r ' 
unlawful, dictallllai-
The FPSA also I 
through the Poll leaurllt 
arms shipment to Piji iR 
(PAF), includiag the paeral 
. 
I L! 1 I ' - J ; 
Sometimes this CORftictld with aion loyalties, as whea a \'ice-
president of the FPSA beiDg 1D PA6 and lJecollling 
a commissioned officer. AD PPSA reporc to the iD 
February 1989 sugested tbat PAF management were tewards die ddworkers' 
union, the Fiji Registered Port Workers' Union. This is aot surp1isiag as its former 
general secretary was Taniela Veitata, the Minister of Bmployment and IDdustrial 
Relations, while the current is a military officer. The militarization of port 
services has strengthened the role of his old union, with its members and those of the 
Port Security Unit pushing FPSA members out of duties covered by the collective 
agreement. The FPSA considers that "PAF is effectively using the union bashing 
technique of divide and rule", particularly as PAF had been one of the strongholds of 
FPSA support. 
In another report to the PI.I'I (Asian and Pacific Regional Conference, November 
1988) the FPSA stressed that the illegal shipment of arms had been used as an excuse to 
harass and detain ttade unionists and political activists after the Internal Security Decree 
was imposed in June 1988 and backdated to March 1988 (Fiji Public Gazette: 2(39), 17 
June 1988). This pantitted the Minister of Home Affairs to detain for up to 2 years any 
person suspected of acting against the national interest of Fiji. Other powers given to the 
Minister included control over censorship of the media. freedom of speech and association 
and total control of individual liberty including the right to exclude persons from Fiji. 
As national interests include essential services, it exposed trade union leaders and 
members in these sectors to the risk of arrest, search of premises and detention. 
Under this decree Chaudhry was again arrested and detained, while the military 
searched his office. The same night the army raided the home of the general secretary of 
the Fiji Oil and Allied Workers Union and FI'UC vice-president, Michael Columbus (Fiji 
Times, 11 June 1988). After being faced with internal and international pressure, the 
Internal Security Decree was suspended in November, but the threat of such coercive 
power being reactivated remains when there is no legitimate guarantee of human rights.9 
This was borne out in early 1989 when Rabuka threatened to reactivate the Internal 
Security Decrees if workers supported the FPSA and FI'UC calls for a genezal strike (Fiji 
Times, 8 April1989). A year later a civilian government ostensibly governed Fiji when 
Rabuka returned to the barracks, but he soon warned that the military would intervene if 
trade unionists attempted to destabilize the country by going on strike (Fiji Times, 23 
January 1990) or if cane farmers refused to harvest cane (Fiji Times, 30 May 1990). 
Veitata's most recent warning to Chaudhry is ominous: "That should he persist in his 
illegal activities, he and his organization will face the strongest possible action of a 
future that both are unlikely to win" (Fiji Times, 13 June 1990). 
"Legal" coercion 
While the adminisbation found that it met obstacles in sustaining trade union compliance 
based on physical coercion, it met fewer problems in imposing "legal" coercion on public 
sector workers. A crucial step was the promulgation of the Public Service Order which 
8 File note, S 108/1043, FPSA, Suva, 29 SepteJnber 1987. 
9 Correspondence from FPSA to Pl'l1, 26 April1989 (S410, FPSA, Suva). 
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revoked the Public Service Act, along with subsidiary legislation. This removed a 
number of key conditions of service which public sector unions had secured in previous 
years and indirectly eroded the protection unions could offer members. The new order 
cancelled appeals against appoinunents, promotions, transfers and gradings, while it also 
facilitated the arbitrary reduction of salaries by 15 percent in 1987. New disciplinary 
offences were stipulated, including "any other offences specified by the Commission." 
While an earlier provision under the Public Service Regulations 1987 provided for the 
establishment of a Disciplinary Appeals Board, by mid-1989 the PSC had shelved this 
proposal (FPSA, Annual Report, 1989, p.26), which further strengthened the arbitrary 
role of the PSC. Relev,ant here is Decree 5 of 1987 under which many members of the 
PSC were appointed by the Commander and Head of State of the military government. 
With the public service decrees remaining in force, PSC members continued to exercise 
lithe provisions of these decrees quite indiscriminately, the military appointees to the 
Service Commissions have wreaked (sic) havoc on the public service" .tO 
The decree also promulgated drastic changes in the composition of the civil service 
which would af~ect FPSA membership. Although the 1970 Constitution provided for 
racial parity in the public sector, the 1987 decree insisted that at least 50 percent of all 
positions at all levels be filled by indigenous Fijians or Rotwnans. Employees were also 
required to retire at 55 instead of the established 60 years. The following quotation 
circulated in CAAF by an anonymous writer exemplifies the paranoia about the power of 
the FPSA and the need for the PSC to weaken this: 
'The present civilian government through the Public Services Commission have 
constructively and systematically severed the tentacle hold of the FPSA through 
the new 1987 Public Services Act whilst the FPSA has endeavoured to use the 
media for local and overseas support and all part of 'the orchestrated effort to 
erode the Military power that is the security foundation of the present civilian 
government. II 
As several reports of the FPSA note, in practice, even regulations were unneccesary 
for those sympathetic to the administration, as they used "favouritism and cronyism" to 
confi1nr1 promotions and appoinunentsl2 (see also FPSA, Annual Report, 1989). 
Although assuring international unions that it would protect human and trade union 
rights, the Fiji administration nev~er relented in its attempt to control public sector 
unions. In April 1989 the Government announced its intention to amend legislation in 
order to prevent several categories of workers from joining trade unions and also to 
sev~erely restrict the right to strike of frre-officers, forest guards, workers classified as 
managers, or dealing with confidential matters. Ultimately it would be up to the 
secretary of the PSC to designate a post as falling within one of these categories. A 
further drastic curtailment to industrial action was the classification of all sectors of the 
civil service as essential services, meaning that 28 days strike notic,e would have to be 
• gtven. 
The latest infringements on trade union rights drew strong condemnation from both 
the FPSA and international trade union bodies. To justify its action the Fiji Government 
misinterpreted International Labour Organization (ILO) ~conventions: 
The recent amendments to the trade union laws were based on ILO Convention 
98, which bars public servants from forming trade unions and, ILO Convention 
151, which allows only certain levels of public servants to be unionized.l3 
10 Fiji Country Report to Pri1 Regional Conference, FPSA, Suv~ 14 November 1988. 
11 ~Correspondence from anonymous writer, 5 February 1988 (S 113/212388, FPSA, Suva). 
12 Corr~espondence from FPSA to Prri, 26 April 1989 (S410, FPS~ Suva). 
13 Correspondence from Prime Minister's office to PSI and NZPSA, 25 May 1'989 (S402, 
FPSA, Suva). 
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However this contravenes the I 16th Report of the ILO Freedom of Association 
Committee which concluded that although Convention 98 may permit (not bar) the 
exclusion of public servants engaged in the administration of the State., a ruling of the 
Committee of Experts states "that the exclusion from the scope of the Convention of 
persons employed by the State or in the public sector who do not act as agents of the 
Public Authority is contrary to the meaning of the Convention." This means that the 
distinction is between civil servants employed in various capacities in government 
ministries and other persons employed by the government. The Committee of Experts 
has also decided that Convention 151 does not overrule the articles of Conv~ention 87, 
(Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948) in respect of the 
public service. According to the 181st report of the Freedom of Association Committee, 
the standards in Convention 87 apply to workers "without distinction whatsoever" and are 
applicable to employees of the State14 (also see ILO, 1988}. 
In its attempt to weaken the Fiji labour movement, the Fiji Government also warned 
the PSI and the New Zealand Public Service Association (NZPSA) that any further 
international trade union action would be construed as interfering in Fiji's sovereignty. 
This did not deter Colin Clark from the NZPSA reiterating to Veitata that his union 
would continue to be guided by unionists in Fiji. IS Hans Engelbert, general secretary of 
the PSI, warned that he could pull strings at a higher level: 
Your country's membership of the ILO and our recognition under the ILO 
Constitution allow us to take such initiative to protect the rights of our 
affiliates and this we shall certainly continue to do in any part of the world 
where the trade union rights of our members are threatened. 
He warned that the PSI could apply pressure through United Nations organizations 
and the resources of PSI's membership in nearly 70 nations. 'The outcome was that the 
international trade union secretariats advised affiliates to protest to the Fiji administration. 
Although the April 1989 amendments were shelved, they could still be implemented 
without notice. 
While the threat of military intervention, detention and other coercive measures ·were 
activated to stamp out trade union activities, in the longer te11n the direct threat to trade 
union rights in the public sector came from regulations and the threat of reactivating 
more coercive ones. Surveillance of these moves by unions both within and outside Fiji 
has been able to counteract the severity of some of the draconian measures. If not for the 
persistence of the FPSA and the influence it has within the FfUC, then the passing of 
time may have led to an acceptance of these infringements, similar to much of the Fiji 
public's resignation to living under a military backed regime. 
Victimization 
The FPSA has also been unrelenting in fighting what it identifi,es as cases of 
victimization of union officials and members even when the industrial relations 
machinery in the public sector has made it extremely difficult to seek redress. The scope 
for victimization has increased greatly in the post-coup atmosphere, where "bullyism" can 
range from physical threats, to blocked transfers, promotions, re-grading, unclear or 
constantly changing job descriptions (so that an officer can not perfoun duties adequately) 
to the threat of disciplinary action. This has been given an enlarged potential when no 
appeals machinery exists. For example after being suspended and then reinstated in 
14 Correspondence from PSI to Prime Minister's Office, 3 August 1989 (HE/HLB/AG-0892, 
FPSA, Suva). 
15 Correspondence from Clark to Veitata, 4 August 1989 (ORG\5\1, NZPSA, Wellington). 
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employment with CAAF in 1987, MuthuSwamy, the President of Labasa branch was 
given notice of transfer to Suva. Chaudhry considered this to be victimization of a union 
official but the only recourse was to take legal action (FPSA National Council minutes, 
10 September 1988). Since the coup FPSA members and officials in Savusavu (a small 
town on the island of Vanua Levu) have reported being harassed by senior departmental 
officers but when resistance was shown, the branch president, Aisea Baitisaresare was 
transferred to Navua on Viti Levu (FPSA National Council Minutes, 18 August 1989). 
Victimization against union supporters was by no means new in the public service 
in Fiji or elsewhere (Bain, 1970, p.132-33). As FPSA records indicate, there were 
several instances of members being wrongly disciplined, forced into early retirement, 
facing unacceptable transfers either to another task (which could be more onerous, of less 
responsibility or more isolating) or to a remote part of Fiji. The 1986 Madhoji Report is 
replete with ~claims of victimization in CAAF, which is partly why this report was not 
released until the Coalition assumed power. As outlined in a general survey of the 
Customs and Excise Department in 1986-87, victimization also operated through positive 
discrimination in favour of those who supported their superiors. These bureaucratic 
patrons might offer for example, appointments, promotions, or leave to attend 
educational courses. Such favouritism had much greater scope after the coups. 
Conversely, the same report noted that junior officers could be made to do the work of 
senior officers because the Principal Collectors had certain officers blacklisted because of 
union activity or personality clashes. 
Fear of victimization did have an impact on dampening members' overt support for 
the FPSA and as union officials noted, this tactic of union control made it difficult to 
recruit and keep liaison officers and branch officials (FPSA, Annual Report, 1987, p.l6; 
National Council Minutes, 10 ~October, 1988). It was also a factor behind the poor 
attendance noted at branch meetings, ,as in these smaller communities it was easier to 
identify people's political sympathies. Life could also become intolerable for ·those being 
constantly harassed, especially where there was no network of sympathetic colleagues. 
For example, Chaudhry had contemplated closing the Labasa branch as its officials had 
been ineffective since the coups. This was attributed to fear of victimization by their 
employer. 
3. Industrial relations practices and union control 
Some of the abov~e fotnts of exerting coercion over labour are outside any fotntal 
industrial relations machinery. Other methods of control hav,e been heightened by the 
removal or non-operation of established industrial relations practices, particularly in the 
public sector. Ther~e ar,e still a number of instances where the Fiji regime, principally 
through the PSC, has utilized the industrial relations machinery in an attempt to weaken 
strong union representation. This suggests that institutionalized industrial relations may 
serve as a means of controlling potential labour unrest (Carter, 1985, p.165-67). 
As noted, the Tripartite Forum initially appeared to offer a structure through which 
labour, employers and the State could resolve a number of industrial relations issues. 
Once the State dispensed with the Forum to negotiate wage guidelines, by imposing a 
unilateral wage and salary freeze in November 1984, tripartism ceased to be a cornerstone 
of Fiji's industrial relations system. Instead, by 1986 the State held annual National 
Economic Summits, which, among other matters, discussed wage policies. Although 
union representatives were invited, as the summit included participants from a wide range 
of community organizations, this can be seen as a move to dissipate the role of unions. 
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In 1989 Ratu Mara admitted that plans were underway to broaden the representation of the 
summit so that it might replace the Tripartite Forum.l6 
A major impact on industrial relations since the coup has been the virtual abeyance 
of established dispute and negotiating machinery. The avoidance of these established 
practices is a further way of rendering unions ineffectual. In short, the FPSA and other 
unions are ignored as legitimate worker representatives when it suits the administration. 
The FPSA has noted that since the coup, employers have exacerbated the already 
entrenched practice of making their own interpretation of collective agreements and of 
breaching their provisions. In early 1988, the general secretary reported "widespread 
breaches of collective agreements in almost every statutory body. Employers have taken 
undue advantage of the current political and economic conditions, using it as a weapon to 
r~educe employment conditions of their employees" (FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p . 31). 
The FPSA still tried to register these clear breaches of collective agreements as 
disputes with the Perman~ent Secretary of Employment and Industrial Relations, but a 
number of means have been used to avoid settling these. Many reported disputes have 
been rejected on the grounds that management has acted in accordance with government 
directives. This occured when the FPSA was blocked in registering a dispute over the 
suspension of members at CAAF, due to directions from the PSC or from Rabuka. 
Here, a .matter which unions perceiv·ed as within their legitimate sphere of concern was 
deemed as falling within "national security" and therefore exempt from established dispute 
settling procedures. Alternatively the Ministry of Labour may use stalling tactics to defer 
taking further action or reaching a decision. This has been a favoured tactic of 
management in the past, especially by the PSC. Other ways of avoiding negotiation and 
settlement have been the outright refusal by the Pe1 auanent Secretary of Employment and 
Industrial Relations to stipulate why a dispute has not been accepted, as when he refused 
to send parties in a National Marketing Authority dispute to arbitration (FPSA, Annual 
Report, 1988, p.20). 
What steps can unions take, especially with the demise of the Tripartite Forum? 
Legal action is an avenue which the FPSA has repeatedly explored since the coup. Even 
this was impossible when the judiciary was suspended for a brief period after the second 
coup. Resorting to the judiciary process is also cumbersom.e and time-consuming, 
especially in a country which has a greatly understaffed and pressured ~court system. It is 
also extremely costly, and while a large union such as the FPSA may have the financial 
resources to take legal action, this is not an option for smaller unions or those whose 
members can not afford to contribute high union dues. Frustration at being hamstrung in 
working through the usual industrial disputes machinery has also precipitated the FPSA 
into gaining its members' mandate to take industrial action. 
Consultative machinery has been a special feature of labour relations in the public 
sector. The Central Whitely Council, introduced in 1966 mainly to deal with staff 
relations, was later reconstituted as the Joint Consultative Council. This body has not 
met since August 1987 and is unlikely to be revived. Alternative joint negotiations by 
staff associations have been dissipated through the PSC holding separate meetings with 
them. Individual employees cases only are discussed while policy matters are arbitrarily 
decided by the Commission. FPSA officials have also been frustrated by the 
confrontational and rigid stance taken by PSC representatives in monthly meetings. 
Union delegates have found that this gave little scope for genuine dialogue as PSC 
officials appeared to have been given a fixed mandate from which to argue. The same 
obstructions seemed to hinder any headway being reached in conciliation meetingsl7 (see 
also FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p.20). 
16 Correspondence from Lavinia Ah Koy. Cabinet Secretary to PSI, 25 May 1989 (S402/288, 
FPSA, Suva). 
17 Correspondence from General Secretary, FPSA to chair, PSC, 3 October 1988 (S224/838, 
FPSA, Suva). 
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Obstructions also came from Aminiasi K.atonivualiku, the Registrar of Trade Unions 
in accepting the registration of some new unions, such as the Fiji Mineworkers Union 
(Fiji Times, 11 January 1990) and in registering amendments to trade union 
constitutions. By early 1989 the Registrar had still not responded to an amendment 
submitted by the FPSA a year earlier to recruit members from the National Trust of Fiji 
(FPSA, Annual Report, 1988, p.31). Similar inttansigence had been a problem in past 
attempts by the FPSA to amend its constitution, especially after controversial changes 
voted in 1986 (FPSA, Annual Report, 1987, p.27). There have been fewer hurdles for 
the registration of some recent ethnically based unions, including the Viti Civil Servants 
Association (VCSA) and the Fiji Air Traffic Controllers Association (FA TCOA). This 
was in spite of protests from existing unions that the Registrar is not impartial, as these 
new unions are contravening the Trade Union Act. FATCOA's 28 members were all 
founer members of the FPSA while by early 1990, 7 of its members were still members 
of the FPSA. Despite FPSA's insistence that FATCOA was encroaching on areas and 
categories served by the FPSA, it was still r~egistered as a trade union.18 Like many 
developing countries, the Registrar of Trade Unions in Fiji, plays a pivotal role in the 
regulation of a compliant union movement (Bean, 1985, p.217). 
4. Ethni ~city and splinter groups 
Employers and the State., generally did not often have to resort to coercion to exert 
control over labour organizations in Fiji. Encouraging the fo1anation of splinter groups 
within workers' organizations has been a tactic repeatedly pursued by management. As 
noted, Fiji's colonial development, centred on the institutionalization of ethnic divisions 
betw~een indigenous Fijians., Indo-Fijians and "others"., has given a solid base upon which 
ethnic fractionalism has often been promoted by the State and other employ~ers. The 
appeal to ethnicity as a means of dividing workers' organizations became more overt once 
demands for some kind of political representation were made by workers in Fiji 
(Durutalo, 1986). 
Attempts by senior Fijian civil servants to fragment the FPSA along ethnic lines 
surfaced long before the political unrest in Fiji of the second half of the 1980s (Leckie, 
1987; 1988). Ethnic ties which stressed loyalty to the chiefs and the State were drummed 
up whenever the civil service thr~eatened or went ahead with industrial action. Communal 
tensions were again brought into play by a "concerned group" led by 10 ethnic Fijian 
members in 1986. Their platfoiin was to purge politics from lrade unions and the civil 
service but more specifically they sought to remove Chaudhry as General Secretary. This 
aimed to destroy the executive ~control held by the National Council and the secretariat's 
influence in the FPSA. The fonnation of a Suva branch would enabl~e the "concerned 
group" to build up its own power base and be relatively autonomous from the National 
~Council. Further plans included the withdrawal of the FPSA from the Fl'UC which 
would destroy one of the main cornerstones of the increasingly assertive union 
movement. 'This was particularly timely with widespread support by public sector 
workers for the recently fonned FLP and with an impending general election. 
Copies of documents of the "concerned group" suggest a more planned strategy, 
dating fro.m the year before the coup, to destabilize the FPSA and much of the union 
support for the FLP. First, the legality of the 1986 annual general meeting of the FPSA 
was to be questioned so that it could be declared null and void; secondly, under "future 
development" were plans to "decentralise to four divisions" so that government would 
withdraw recogniton of the FPSA. Ethnic Fijian "contacts"', many in senior bureaucratic 
positions, were also identified. A meeting with ~civil servants on 26 April 1986 in Nadi 
decided to fonn a breakaway Fiji Civil Servants' Association. 
18 FPSA Report to ITF Asia/Pacific Civil Aviation seminar Go~ 10 January 1990. 
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The rise of the Taukei movement during 1987 and its endorsement by the military 
regime, gave more open support by the authorities for the foiination of a union to rival 
and possibly weaken the FPSA. On 9 July 1987 at the Fijian Teachers' Association 
building, members of the "concerned group" who had been expelled from the FPSA 
founded the Viti Civil Servants' Association. It emerged when the military regime and 
the PSC were trying to impose a 25 percent salary cut and other retrenchment measures 
on the civil service (Fiji Times, 7 July 1987). When the FPSA and other civil service 
unions threatened a nationwide strike, the PSC, in the wake of an ultimatum which 
threatened the redundancy of 12,000 officers, went ahead with the imposition of a 15 
percent salary cut. Meanwhile the VCSA and the Public Employees' Union willingly 
acquiesced to pay cuts and proposed that civil servants give up other allowances they were 
entitled to (Fiji Times, 10 July 1987; 13 July 1987). Although it claimed political 
neutrality, a number of sources suggest that the VCSA was backed by senior members of 
the PSC. On 17 August 1987 a member wrote to Chaudhry concerning a group which 
was trying to destabilize the union: "It is very clear that P.S.C. staff have been asked 
from the top to divide the Association."l9 Taniela Tabu, the secretary of the VCSA, was 
also a senior civil servant in the PSC and the official side secretary in the Joint 
Consultative Council. The interim president was the Peunanent Secretary for Health, Dr 
Filimone Wainiqolo. As noted, the attitude of the PSC towards the civil service unions 
suggested that the PSC was coming under the direct control of the military regime. As 
well as encouraging splinter groups, the PSC was simultaneously encouraging 
management to promote the regime's policies by, for ~example, issuing circulars and 
having pocket meetings with staff. The identity of management with Fijian ethnicity and 
a hostile attitude towards the FPSA has also been facilitated by the "purge" of senior 
Indian civil servants from the civil service and attempts to introduce legislation 
prohibiting managers from being union members. 
Since the VCSA proclaimed its loyalty to the regime (Fiji Times, 10 July 1987; 13 
July 1987) it is not surprising that the union's registration was accepted. According to 
the Trade Union Act, any 7 persons may fo1n1 a union but must then seek registration. 
This can be refused if another trade union is already registered and adequately 
representative of the whole, or a substantial proportion of the interests pertaining to those 
seeking registration of a new union. The VCSA, like other exclusively ethnic Fijian 
unions, justified their claims on the grounds that: 
Under the Trade Union (Recognition) Act there is nothing to stop an employer 
from accepting racial grouping as a basis for recognition of a trade union if a 
racial group feels that a particular multi-racial grouping for trade union purposes 
does not protect their interests (Fiji Times, 4 May 1989). 
To substantiate this, Tabu argued that trade unions had been monopolized by Indians 
because of their numerical domination of the workforce. Indian commiunent to the 
labour movement was dismissed as manipulation to suit their own "racial needs" (Fiji 
Times, 4 May 1989). The PSC also overlooked a stipulation under the Trade Union 
(Recognition) Act that a union should represent 50 percent or more of the employees for 
whom recognition is sought when it faunally recognized the VCSA (Fiji Times, 25 
March 1988). 
The bark of the VCSA has been bigger than its actual bite. Although its recruitment 
activities have been effective in trimming the membership of the FPSA, as elaborated 
below, the reduction in FPSA membership is not solely due to VCSA activities . 
Chaudhry has questioned Tabu's claims (Fiji Times, 28 April 1990) of having 1010 
members in the ·vcsA. This included new civil service recruits, who were more likely 
to be ethnic Fijians or Rotumans and more susceptible to anti-FPSA propaganda. FPSA 
19 Correspondence to FPSA, 17 August 1987 (FPSA, Suva). 
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records also indicate that some newly recruited members of the VCSA have returned to 
the fold of the FPSA. Some of these "swinging" members have been opportunistic. 
They have joined the V~CSA in the hope that this might facilitate promotions or other 
favours but have then rejoined the FPSA, especially once they realized that they might 
lose valued socio-economic benefits. FPSA attraction also lies in its greater experience 
and superior resources to fight individual as well as collective grievances. 
Nevertheless, the VCSA still continued to be a thorn in the FPSA's side, with 
members being pressured to support government policies and the VCSA. Increased 
Taukei influence in management has also widened the scope for VCSA supporters 
victimizing FPSA members. At the very least, this means that FPSA members can be 
intimidated against criticizing the VCSA. The presence of a VCSA group in a 
department can also inhibit recruitment and overt support for the FPSA. At another 
level, the VCSA also operates as a propagandist of the administration and condemns 
criticism of policies directed at the public sector and its employees. They also staunchly 
endorse policies which advance the appointment and promotion of indigenous Fijians. 
The FPSA never questioned the necessity of this but has criticized the pace of 
indigenization, the discriminatory practices this leads to, and what are considered to be 
adverse effects on the quality of public services in Fiji. The VCSA has also clearly 
separated itself from the FPSA's approach to industrial action by passing resolutions at 
the 1989 and 1990 annual general meetings opposing national strikes and advocating the 
dismissal and replacment of civil servants taking part in any national strik~e (Fiji Times, 
1 July 1989; 28 April 1990). 
According to FPSA sources, the VCSA was responsible for circulating a number of 
malicious rumours, petitions and circulars to facilitate the ~easy withdrawal of groups of 
members from the FPSA. Chaudhry has questioned the authenticity of som~e of these 
signatur~es and suggested, for example, that defamatory statements and some of the 26 
signatures of members in the Public Works department on a letter may have been the 
work of the v~CSA. Their r~easons for resignation were similar to those given in some 
bulk withdrawals from other departments: 
This is due to the fact that you have used the FPSA, to further your political 
interest, under the guise of Union Solidarity. Furthermore, your dictatorial and 
unscrupulous acts, deviates from democracy, but could be found behind the iron 
curtain. You should, after all practice what you preach. FARE THEE WELL 
COMRADE.20 
Rumours also helped the VCSA to foun the Good Samaritan ~credit Union. 
Supposedly, its rival, the Fiji Public Service Credit Union, had been misusing funds in 
early 1987 although it did announce record dividends during this period (Fiji Times, 6 
February 1988). 
Since the coup, there have been other attempts to fo11n unions exclusiv~ely for 
Fijians, such as the Fijian Sugar Workers' Union (Fiji Times, 4 May 1989). Just as the 
VCSA was advised by the Fijian Teachers' Association, so the VCSA is keen to promote 
the fotnaation of breakaway unions for ethnic Fijians. In opposition to the FI'UC, the 
Viti Trades Union Council was set up by the FTA., Fijian Sugar Workers' Union, Native 
Land Trust Board Staff Association, Fijian Affairs Board Staff Association, Air Pacific 
Viti Employees' Union and Fijian Registered Port Workers' Union. Tabu saw these 
unions playing their part in busting any anticipated strikes and pledged that the VCSA 
would mobilize all Fijian workers by activating the Viti Trade Union Council if the 
F·ruc went on strike. This declaration coincided with the FPSA serving a strike notice 
(Fiji Times, 28 April 1990) and the possibility that farmers would boycott the 1990 cane 
harvest. 
20 Correspondence from FPSA members to FPSA, 28 April 1988 (512/1957, FPSA Suva). 
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Appealing to ethnic ties has been a powerful tactic in promoting splinter groups 
from powerful trade unions such as the FPSA. Other rival groups ~encouraged by 
management do not necessarily cater to one ethnic group, although much of their support 
may come from indigenous Fijians. For example, ~CAAF recognized FATCOA, 
although FPSA had objected to its registration as a trade union.21 Another rival union in 
the aviation industry has been dismissed by the FPSA's Nadi branch as solely aiming to 
fragment FPSA solidarity.22 
A further divisive tactic by the Government aimed at weakening trade union 
solidarity, especially within the public sector, has been to play upon difterences between 
established and unestablished staff. This does not neatly correlate with perceived ethnic 
categories but has been tied in with attempts to stir up divisions between workers who 
have been categorized as "blue collar" and "white collar". Most of the unestablished staff 
in the public sector are "blue collar" and represented by the Public Employees' Union. 
There were several instances prior to the coup when the PEU accepted wage restrictions, 
through fear of redundancies (Leckie, 1988, p.l58). In return, the PEU was supportive of 
the Alliance Government and have never called a strike. Their loyalty was assured after 
the coup when the PEU accepted pay-cuts and advised its members "to stay away from 
active politics. Any direct action now can only make matters worse and prolong the 
current crisis" .23 
Other divisive forces had the potential to weaken trade unions in Fiji. These factions 
have been an interplay of internal and external pressures, sometimes playing upon ethnic 
loyalties, at other times reflecting attempts to stir up divisions between the so-called blue 
and white collar workers and private and public sector workers. Political affiliations may 
be an underlying motivation, as for example, when some trade unionists, such as 
Mahendra Sukhdeo, attempted to discredit the FLP in early 1987 by claiming it was 
dominated by the "white collar elitist" FI'UC (Fiji Sun ., 8 January 1987). After the 
coup, the Fl'UC came close to being severely ruptured by internal divisions. These 
sprang not only from Taukeist unionists but also from other long-standing, ideological 
and personal differences between executive members. A key issue centred on the pressure 
the FI'UC would take against the regime, especially over the degree of industrial action 
that the FI'UC would ~call for locally and internationally. When the president, Jale Told., 
announced that the FI'UC would shelve its threatened strike, he contradicted the views of 
several affiliates (Fiji Times, 13 June 1989; 14 June 1989). Toki's reluctance to keep the 
strike threat was shared by a recently fotaned Association of Private Sector Unions, led by 
FI'UC officials deposed in early 1988, former Treasurer, Bob Kumar, and fot1ner General 
Secretary, James Raman (Fiji Times, 10 October 1988; 12 September 1988). This group 
pressed for the removal of several members of the FI'UC management, especially 
Chaudhry, on the grounds that their political activities were adversely affecting the FI'UC 
(Fiji Times, 6 June 1989). Chaudhry claimed that the ~Government's refusal to r~ecognize 
the Congress and its attempts to send individual invitations to a National Economic 
Summit was a ''government ploy to create divisions within the union movement" (Fiji 
Times, 12 June 1989). 
Within the FPSA, ex~ecutive members, Tupeni Tavutonivalu and Jese Ligari, 
publicly discredited Chaudhry's union duties and his affliation to the FLP (Fiji Times, 4 
August 1989). Sources suggest that such internal rifts represent part of a strategy to tum 
the FPSA into a compliant puppet of the regime. These personal attacks were reiterated 
by Fijian members of the Board of Fire Commissioners of Suva when they filed a 
petition de,manding the suspension of Chaudhry. This occur~ed in a year which began 
with a strike and a go-slow by the Board's employees and led on to the FPSA challenging 
several management decisions (FPSA, Annual Report, 1988., p.36). 
21 FPSA Report to ITF Asia/Pacific Civil Aviation Seminar Goa, 10 January 1990. 
22 FPSA Newsletter, June 1989. 
23 PEU Newsletter, 20 August 1987. 
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5. Membership levels 
How can we assess the impact of these moves to weaken trade unions, especially the 
FPSA in Fiji? Although threatened by physical coer~cion and hamstrung by repressive 
legislation, the FPSA has persisted in trying to pursue individual and collective 
grievances. Its leadership has also continued to be outspoken about wider issues in Fiji, 
especially those which affect the material welfare and political rights of workers. The fact 
that members and officials still report instances of victimization suggests that union 
members have not been silenced into complete submission. In 1989 members voted a 50 
percent rise in union deductions, indicating their confidence in the management and 
activities of the FPSA. The increase in union dues also ~ensured a steady income 
necessary with rising inflation, and extra costs incurred for legal support and socio-
economic projects. Additional revenue has also been essential to counteract declining 
membership l~evels, particularly if the Association aims to maintain and expand the 
quality of its services. 
The effects of attempts to weaken the union ,are shown in the dramatic falls in 
membership levels since the coup. As table I indicates, FPSA membership has fallen by 
2552, or 36 percent, between 1986 and 1989. Membership declines were higher in the 
civil service (37 percent) compared to statutory bodies (27 percent). Excluding statutory 
bodies, the civil service had, by early 1989, 4492 FPSA members (77 percent) compared 
to 1341 non-members (23 percent).24 The drop for 1990 will be even greater if the 
association is unsuccessful in its bid to regain about 1053 members from the fo1 1ner 
Department of Posts and Telecommunications employed since January 1990 in the new 
company, Fiji Posts and T~elecommunciations Limited. Li.k~e trends elsewhere, the 
privatization of public services in Fiji opens the way to changes in labour organizations, 
with the potential w~eakening and decentralization of strong encompassing unions. 
Anti-FPSA elem~ents have attributed the fall in membership to disenchantment with 
the union, but as noted, there have been a number of other factors, stemming from 
developments since the coups, which have contributed to membership loss. A principal 
factor has been the substantial number of resignations and retirements from the civil 
service since the coups. It is likely that most of these were union supporters. Many 
vacant posts have not been renewed or filled, as shown in the declining size of the civil 
service since 1987. 'The changing ethnic composition of the service (table 4), due to the 
high percentage of Indo-Fijians (72 percent) among those resigning or retiring (table 2), 
along with a marked increase of ethnic Fijians as new appointments (table 3), also had 
implications for the success of union recruitment. The FPSA still recruits many of these 
as new members., but there ar~e greater setbacks in attracting appointees who may hav~e 
developed anti-union prejudices during the past few years. Some may also perceiv·e 
support of the FPSA to be "un-Fijian" and consequently be more responsive to overtures 
from the VCSA. 
The activiti~es of the V·CSA have also encouraged block resignations of ~ethnic Fijians 
from the FPSA. Initially this was confined to departments where Fijian employees 
predominated, such as Public Works, Health .and Primary Industries. Letters of 
resignation (which were often copies of one another) protested at the perceived political 
involvement of the association. N~evertheless, the FPSA's 1988 Annual Report revealed 
that while there had been a decline of 1113 compared to 1987, that only 267 members (or 
24 peroent of those who had resigned) had left the FPSA but were still in service (FPSA. 
Annual Report, 1988, p.19) and not all of these necessarily joined another union. 
Around April 1989 there was a noticeable increase in individual resignations which 
included a rise among Indo-Fijians and £emales. Their letters stressed that because of 
financial hardship they could not meet the proposed increases in fees by the FPSA. 
24 Report of the Membership ~Committee, S12{706, FPSA, Suv~ January 1989. 
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'Table 1: Membership levels of the FPSA 1986-89 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Civil Service 
6254 
5690 
4613 
3955 
Statutory Bodies 
938 
715 
681 
685 
Source: FPSA membership files; Annual Reports 1986-89. 
Total 
7192 
6405 
5294 
4640 
Table 2: Resignations and retirements from the Fiji civil service (by ethnic group) 
Resignations Retirements 
Period Fijiana Indianb Otherc Total Fijiana Indianb Otherc Total 
July-Decl987 
Jan-Dec 1988 
Jan-June1989 
Total 
Total resignations 
25 
95 
37 
157 
and retirements 377 
187 
539 
178 
904 
1214 
30 242 56 194 
37 671 122 96 
13 228 42 20 
80 1141 220 310 
104 1695 
Source: FPSA membership files; Annual Reports 1986-89. 
Notes: a Ethnic Fijians . 
b Indo-Fijians. 
c Other ethnic groups. 
Table 3: New appointments in the Fiji civil service (by ethnic group) 
Period 
1/7/87 - 30/6/88 
1/7/87 - 1/6/89 
Total 
Fijian a 
534 
191 
725 
Indianb 
196 
106 
302 
Source: FPSA membership files; Annual Reports 1986-89 . 
Notes: a Ethnic Fijians. 
b lndo-Fijians. 
c Other ethnic groups. 
Otherc 
100 
48 
148 
2 252 
18 236 
4 66 
24 554 
'Total 
830 
345 
1175 
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Table 4: Ethnic composition of the Fiji civil service 
Period 
1/5/87 
30/6/88 
31/5/89 
Compared 
Fijian• 
no 
8067 
8413 
8648 
to 1/5/87 +581 
percent 
46.8 
49.9 
53.0 
-
Indianb 
no peocent 
8208 47.6 
7621 44.6 
7127 43.0 
-1081 
no 
962 
928 
648 
-214 
Source: FPSA membership files; Annual Reports 1986-89. 
Notes: a Ethnic Fijians. 
b lndo-Fijians . 
c Other ethnic groups. 
Other: Total 
percent 
5.6 17237 
5.5 16962 
4.0 14423 
During 1989 resignations became more scattered throughout government departments 
and spread outside Suva. The most recent cause of further resignations has been from the 
privatization of Posts and Telecommunciations. 
While the FPSA responded to this membership drop by invoking a membership 
drive, it faced further setbacks with management policies in mid-1989. Until then the 
Association monitored current and potential membership by having access to the monthly 
employment printout for the civil service. When this SP.rvice was refused by the 
Peuuanent Secretary for Finance in August 1989., the FPSA suggested that this was 
because of a cabinet direction to protect the VCSA and not cooperate with the FPSA.25 
Although the FPSA found alternative means to keep track of these records, such action 
has increased the workload of the union secretariat. 
There have also been instances of managem.ent facilitating union withdrawals and 
wrongfully ceasing union deductions. According to th~e FPSA's constitution, members 
should individually sub.mit a letter of r~esignation to the G~eneral Secretary. When., for 
example, the Per.manent Secr~etary for Posts and Telecommunications was advised by 
Chaudhry that he had wrongfully stopped 135 members deductions26 he then provided 
staff with union withdrawal fot n1s. These were on a circular which also thanked staff 
who had signed a petition to the FPSA calling for the lifting of trade bans against Fiji by 
overseas unions. Chaudhry described this as: 
very provocative, it directly serves to undermine the unity and solidarity of 
members ... Your decision and action to furnish such forms, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally is a direct attempt to weaken the Association 
because it encourages and facilitates membership withdrawai.27 
25 File S12/2339, FPSA, Suva., 17 August 1989. 
26 Correspondence from FPSA to Permanent Secretary, Post and Telecommunications, 15 
July 1987 (S 12/1672, FPSA, Suva). 
27 Correspondence from FPSA to Permanent Secretary, Post and Telecommunications, 5 
August 1987 (S12/1709, FPSA, Suva). 
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6. Fighting back 
Falling membership numbers, along with other divisive tactics aimed at weakening 
the FPSA, have boosted moves by the union to reverse these trends. By late 1989, the 
FPSA embarked upon a membership drive which sought to dissuade members from 
resigning and to sign up non-members, especially new civil service recruits. 
Another strategy to strengthen the union has been restructuring. There has been an 
effort to revive the role of liaison officers, the organizers at the office-floor level. While 
some branches such as Labasa appear to have been weakened by dissident elements, 
others, especially Nadi and .Lautoka have been strengthened through the establishment of 
full-time secretariats since late 1988. A further move to encourage members' 
participation, has been the reactivation of the Women's Wing in early 1988 and proposals 
for a Youth Wing. Emphasis has also been given to strengthen union education and 
training courses within Fiji since 1988. 
One of the most important drawcards for union membership, recently expanded by 
the FPSA, has been socio-economic benefits for its members. While pragmatically these 
are incentives to attract and retain members, these projects also grew from a conviction, 
ardently advocated by a former FPSA president, Bava~ that unions should take a broader 
role than simply being ~concerned with workplace matters. Socio-economic schemes 
would play an educational role, both for members and as models of alternative structures 
for the wider public. The oldest scheme which is administered separately from the FPSA 
is the FPSA Credit Union, but its origins owe as much to the enthusiasm for credit co-
operative schemes in Fiji than to any specific union ideology. A change in the direction 
of socio-economic projects, partly because of Bavadra's influence, developed in July 1988 
with the establishment of Fiji's frrst union-controlled medical centre in Suva along with 
similar services for branch members and their families. Other union benefits include 
assistance for overseas medical treatment, a retirement benefit, a bereavement payment to 
spouses and housing assistance through the FPSA Investment Cooperative Association. 
The membership and publicity drive, restructwing of the union and increased socio-
economic benefits have been some of the means by which the FPSA has tried to retain 
its membership. As this paper documents, the FPSA has counteracted attempts to 
weaken it and the Fiji labour movement through many other means. It has firmly 
maintained its assertive stand on the salaries and conditions of its members, personal and 
wider grievances, general conditions in the public service and trade union rights and issues 
affecting the general public. As far as possible, the FPSA has attempted to utilize 
established industrial practices although since the coup it has resorted to legal action to an 
unprecedented extent. While the breakdown of much of the industrial relations machinery 
has affected all unions in Fiji, the FPSA has faced specific obstacles in relation to its 
changed relationship with management and the especially the PSC. The style of the 
FPSA has generally been to keep channels open for dialogue and to threaten industrial 
action only when further discussions were delayed or blocked. While ~consultation 
between the FPSA and the PSC has been eroded since the coup, there have been positive 
improvements in labour relations in statutory bodies, especially within CAAF. 
Given the restraints to negotiation, members at post-coup meetings have endorsed 
resorting to industrial action to restore salary levels and other conditions. This is not a 
radical departure from the past but does indicate that the association is detei •nined not to 
be cowered into taking a submissive stance. In April 1990, the FPSA filed a 28 day 
strike notice in response to government's refusal to grant civil servants a 6 percent pay 
increase pe11uitted to other workers in 1988 and to allow civil servants the 12 percent 
increase in allowances payable under a wage order issued in 1989. The strike notice was 
rejected by the Ministry of Employment and Industrial Relations on the grounds that 
there is a court case pending on the issue. Chaudhry kept the strike notice as he 
maintained that the Ministry and the PSC were in collusion as the court action was 
Public sector unionism in Fiji 69 
challenging the authority of the Ministry of Finance to impose regulatory wage increases 
and to frustrate provisions of a contract of employment. Striking was not resorted to, as 
the administration finally agreed to the pay increase (FPSA, Annual Report, 1989, p.lS-
16; Fiji Times, 31 March 1990; 20 April 1990; 4 June 1990). 
Partly because of the virtual impossibility of legally going on strike, the FPSA has 
retaliated to attacks on unions by taking the debate to a wider level. One of the biggest 
strengths it has is that its general secretary holds the same position with the FI'UC. 
This has reinforced links which public sector unions have developed with external union 
and labour organizations. Ultimately this means that trade unions in Fiji can muster 
international solidarity and sanctions if pressed. 
Trade bans are a last resort and international bodies are reluctant to take this step 
until all other avenues are exhausted. The International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFI'U), to which the FI'UC is affiliated, has played a critical role in 
monitoring trade union rights and labour conditions in Fiji and in facilitating dialogue 
between the unions and government An ICFI'U mission to Fiji in October 1989 secured 
a statement of intent from the Economic Strategy Committee of Cabinet. This aimed to 
restore recognition of the FI'UC as the sole repr~esentative body of unions and workers in 
Fiji, r~estore trade union rights, reactivate tripartite bodies and recognize ll..O standards in 
future reviews of industrial laws and procedures (Pacific U.nio.nist, 1989, p.l). To date, 
government has not implemented these agreements, which is reminiscent of the "false 
respectability" displayed by government in previous assurances given to the ICFI'U.28 
The regime's lack of commiunent to agreements made with international labour bodies 
has been spelt out by recent threats to ban the ICFI'U from Fiji (Fiji Times, 9 June 
1990). 
7. C~onclusion 
During the past 3 years, the regime in Fiji has given a taste of the lengths it is 
prepared to take to squash challenges to its hegemony. Labour-State relations are a far 
cry from the comparatively consultative style under tripartism during 1976-84. Even 
then, strains were becoming marked. The abandonment of tripartism, moves towards 
unilateral decisions by government and threats of bringing in the army pushed unions 
into seeking redress to economistic problems through political ends. Material issues 
were not the only ones, as unions, ~especially the FPSA, saw their legitimate concern to 
be corruption, State and management policies and after the coup, human and democratic 
rights. 
What is the biggest threat to unions in Fiji today? This paper has documented 
manoeuvres to fragment unions, ~especially along ethnic lines. 'This had some impact on 
the FPSA but not as much as anti-union dissidents had wished. ~Changes in the labour 
market, the setting up of new industries in tax -free zones and the restructuring of 
government bodies will gr~eatly weaken the labour movement unless it is able to adjust 
its own style to attract and maintain workers' support. The State has resorted to ouuight 
coercion and could ban unions but this might lead to the kind of international pressure 
even Fiji's ardent union-bashers wish to avoid. On the other hand, recent Taukei 
extremists saw the solution in creating a leadership vacuum by deporting some labour 
leaders, such as Chaudhry. 
Unions, particularly the FPSA, have built up a strong base and have drawn upon 
years of experience to counter attacks directed at them after the coup. Throughout most 
of their history they have faced hostility and negative images, especially from the press. 
In 1985, many observers saw anti-unionism stemming from those with political control 
and realized that the labour movement would have to secure a political base if it was to 
28 Correspondence from NZPSA to Veitata, 4 August 1989 (ORG/5/1, NZPSA, Wellington). 
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avert a pattern of State-labour relations heading in the dir~ection of Singapore where 
"unions would be tolerated but their power would be significantly curbed" (FPSA, 
Annual Report, 1987, p.12). Today, unions have lost their political base and the 
promulgation of a new constitution leaves little hope of operating within a sympathetic 
political context. Although the political constraints are being tightened, it is likely that 
further constraints will be placed upon the operations of trade unions in Fiji. The record 
has shown that after being blocked from seeking redress through the legal machinery or 
through the courts, when unions pull out their ultimate w~eapon, the threat of local or 
international industrial action, this is construed by their opponents as a politically 
~engineered move to topple the regime. When unionists speak out about trade union 
rights or other inequalities then this is also labelled political (see letters to editor Fiji 
Times, 13 September 1988; 19 August 1988). In order to protect their members' 
interests, trade unions in Fiji are fighting for their survival but this is most unlikely to 
lead to a "deal" with Fiji's forseeable political leaders. Their survival and struggle is very 
much a political issue, particularly as they will have to operate within a political 
structure they have never endorsed, and are unlikely to endorse. 
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